top of page
Search

An Outlook for the 2023 Election in Argentina

  • Writer: Internationally
    Internationally
  • Feb 15, 2023
  • 5 min read

By Miranda Cortizo -


The famous phrase “It's the economy, stupid” featured in Bill Clinton's successful campaign against George W. Bush to occupy the Presidency of the United States back in 1992. The popularity of the claim does not only come from the surprise insult to a public figure, but also from the message itself. "It's the economy, stupid" suggests that the average citizen at the time of voting does not focus on the different programmatic proposals of candidates while thinking about his future (as traditional political science theory suggests), but rather looks at the past and makes an evaluation (1). If the voter considers that the country is better off now than before the incumbent’s presidency began, he will vote for the government's candidate. However, if he considers it to be worse off, he will vote for the opposition. According to the Clinton campaign, being "better" or "worse" off is defined in economic terms.


Amongst scholars, this phenomenon is known as “retrospective voting”; but most of us commonly know it as “punishment vote”. Punishment vote has been crucial to explain Mauricio Macri (Juntos por el Cambio party) downfall in 2019 and hence the rise of the current President: Alberto Fernandez (Frente de Todos party). How will this translate in the upcoming Presidential election in Argentina in October 2023? Will Fernandez suffer the same fate as Macri in the current economic panorama?


For our projections we will analyze four variables, following Abramowitz’s model for predicting elections based on retrospective voting: the President’s net approval, the change in real GDP in the second trimester of the electoral year, if it's the first or second re-election and the level of polarization. All the variables in Abramowitz model have proven to be statistically significant; and his model predicted 15 out of the 16 Presidential elections in the US after the second world war (2).


Firstly, according to the ESPOP survey in November 2022 -where 1023 adults from eight different Argentinian regions were interviewed- only 21% approve of the government of Alberto Fernandez, while 76% disapprove. This leaves a net approval of -55%. Furthermore, only 4% of the sample highly approves while 60% highly disapproves (3). This means that the guaranteed votes in favor of Fernandez are much less than the votes that would definitely be against him. Although a lot can change in a year, it is unlikely that such significant numbers will overturn. Under Abramowitz's first parameter, this decreases the chances of winning.


For evaluating the change in real GDP in the second trimester of the electoral year (2023) we will consider the numbers predicted by the survey of macroeconomic expectations made by El Cronista (EMEC) during December 2022. This survey interviews market experts, including banks, independent consultant firms and investment analyzers, among others. The average prediction for GDP changes from the beginning till the end of the second trimester of 2023 (April-June) is 2,3% (nominal, not real) (4). In addition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCDE) foresees a total rise in real GDP of 0,5% in 2023 (5). This suggests a more positive outlook for Fernandez. Nevertheless, the OECD report informed what all Argentinians already know: the overall economy of the country is in recession.


Moreover, there is a key economic issue particularly important for Argentinians that Abramowitz did not consider: inflation. According to ESPOP’s November 2022 edition, most of the interviewed (58%) consider that inflation is the main problem currently affecting the country (3). Since December 2019 -when Fernandez took office- until December 2022, the inflation rate has been approximately 300% (6). This deeply affects the population’s daily life, as their money loses real value. For instance, according to data from INDEC (the National Institute of Statistics and Census), with 1000 pesos in December 2019 one could buy 5.6kg of minced meat, but only 1.4kg in December 2022. Similarly, one could buy 11 dozen eggs in December 2019, but only between 2 and 3 dozen in December 2022 (7). In addition, the survey of market expectations (REM) conducted by the Central Bank predicted that inflation for 2023 is close to 100% (8). According to ESPOP’s November 2022 edition, only 12% of the interviewed consider themselves to be in a better personal situation compared to last year, while 53% consider themselves to be worse off (3). On this account, voters may ponder their purchasing power as a more tangible variable than the country’s GDP growth, and use this information for retrospective voting. The outlook for Fernandez is not so positive -to say the least- when examining this topic.


In third place, it is the first time that Alberto Fernandez can run for re-election. According to Abramowitz “the longer a party has been in power, the more likely the public is to feel that ‘it's time for a change’”(2). This appears to be positive for Fernandez.


Another key issue is polarization. Polarization basically is “loving my own party” or “hating the other party”. In Argentina, the latter is typical. This does not play well for Fernandez, as voters who don’t approve of his government will vote strategically for the strongest opposing party; not because they particularly like the opposing candidate, but because they have developed a hatred towards the incumbent. This is known as affective polarization (9). In Abramowitz’s model, if the President has a positive net approval or it is his second term, the Polarization variable will be 1. If he has a negative approval or if it's the first term it will be -1 (2). In Fernandez’s case, it is his first term but has a negative approval, so they balance each other out.


Ultimately, even if it's Fernandez’s first term, neither his net presidential approval nor Argentina's economic outlook, particularly regarding inflation, are positive. These two are closely related: there is a strong correlation between those who said that they were personally worse off than last year and those who have a negative image of the President. Hence, as Clinton well said: “it's the economy, stupid”. With the current economic predictions there is little to no chance that Fernandez’s net image changes. Therefore, he is not likely to win in 2023. In fact, using Abramowitz’s equation, the percentage of votes for Fernandez wouldn't currently be enough for him to win. This experiment should be done again in July 2023, when the values are more accurate.


Nevertheless, Abramowitz couldn’t possibly have predicted Argentina’s surprise factor: Fernandez’s party, Frente de Todos, will strategically divide to distance themselves from the incumbent’s government, as they have already hinted in the Senate. Therefore, even if Fernandez doesn’t get re-elected, it does not necessarily mean that the opposition will win either. The Frente de Todos party will most likely be divided into Fernandez's supporters, Cristina Kirchner’s followers and Sergio Massa's voters. Knowing what retrospective voting is and how it works under the Abramowitz model makes us, future voters, have a better grasp on Argentina’s complicated electoral panorama.



1. Sigelman, Lee, and William D. Berry. “Cost and the Calculus of Voting.” Political Behavior 4, no. 4 (1982): 419–28. http://www.jstor.org/stable/586361.


2. Abramowitz Alan, “Forecasting in a Polarized Era: The Time for Change Model and the 2012 Presidential Election”, PS: Political Science and Politics 45, no.4 (October 2012): 618-619. Consultado: 29 de junio de 2022. https://www.jstor.org/journal/pspolisciepoli

3. “Encuesta de Satisfacción Política y Opinión Pública #ESPOP”, Universidad de San Andrés, acceso 14 de Febrero de 2023, https://web.udesa.edu.ar/sites/default/files/31._udesa_espop_oct-nov_2022.pdf

4. Agustin Szafranko, “Los 6 gráficos que anticipan qué va a pasar en 2023 con el dólar, la inflación, el déficit y el PBI”, El Cronista, 29 de diciembre, 2022, https://www.cronista.com/economia-politica/seis-graficos-que-anticipan-que-va-a-pasar-en-2023-con-la-inflacion-el-deficit-y-el-pbi/

6. Annabella Quiroga, “Alberto Fernández acumula casi 300% de inflación en tres años de gobierno”, Clarín, 9 de diciembre, 2022, https://www.clarin.com/economia/alberto-fernandez-acumula-300-inflacion-anos-gobierno_0_QUCjzEZ9OX.html


7. “Indice de precios al consumidor”, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC), accedido el 14 de Febrero de 2023, https://www.indec.gob.ar/indec/web/Nivel4-Tema-3-5-31

9. Iyengar, Shanto et al., “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States”, Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2018):129-46. https://pcl.sites.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj22066/files/media/file/iyengar-ar-origins.pdf


Photo: Reuters

Comments

bottom of page